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Analyzing Horizontal Mergers: 
Unilateral Effects in Product-Differentiated Markets 
ABSTRACT 
 This essay offers a brief, non-technical exposition of the 
antitrust analysis of horizontal mergers in product differentiated 
markets where the resulting price increase is thought to be 
“unilateral” – that is, only the post-merger firm increases its prices 
while other firms in the market do not.  More realistically, non-
merging firms who are reasonably close in product space to the 
merging firm will also be able to increase their prices when the post-
merger firm’s prices rise.  The unilateral effects theory is robust and 
has become quite conventional in merger analysis.  There is 
certainly no reason for thinking that it involves any more conjecture 
than what occurs in traditional concentration-increasing merger 
analysis.  Nevertheless, as with all predictions about mergers, we 
must live with a certain measure of uncertainty. 
 
Analyzing Horizontal Mergers: 
Unilateral Effects in Product-Differentiated Markets 
Herbert Hovenkamp*
 
 
Introduction: diversion ratios and critical loss analysis 
The impact of a merger among “adjacent” firms in a product-
differentiated market is illustrated by a well-known diagram, shown in 
Figure A, of a row of hot dog vendors arrayed across a beach during 
the summer, spaced approximately 50 yards apart.1
                                                 
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. 
 
 Assume that the 
1 The illustration comes from Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 Econ. J. 
41 (1929). See also Jonathan B. Baker, Market Concentration in the Antitrust Analysis of 
Horizontal Mergers, in Antitrust Law & Economics (Keith Hylton, ed., 2009) (excellent, 
moderately technical); Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Unilateral Competitive 
Effects of Horizontal Mergers, ch. 3, in Handbook of Antitrust Economics (Paolo 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1359288
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hot dogs and their vendors are physically identical but the 
differentiation applies to the variable distances that bathers must 
walk in order to reach a hot dog stand. Assume further that the pre-
merger price of each vendor is a dollar, and that bathers, who are 
the potential customers, are willing to pay as much as two dollars for 
each hot dog, less one cent for each yard they must walk. Thus, 
when all vendors charge the same price, the customers always 
maximize their value by walking to the closest vendor, but they would 
be willing to walk to any vendor who is as far as 100 yards away. 
The 100-yard remote vendor produces value to the customer of 
precisely the hot dog's price, and at that price no customer will walk 
to a vendor who is 101 yards or farther away. The vendors are called 
A, B, C, D…N. 
 
 
In this setting a potential customer would be willing to purchase a 
hot dog from as many as five vendors. For example, if she were 
sunbathing precisely at the location of vendor D, then vendors C and 
E would be 50 yards away in either direction, and vendors B and F 
would be 100 yards away in either direction. Ordinarily the customer 
would prefer to purchase from D, which gives her value of $2.00 for a 
price of $1.00. Since she must walk 50 yards to either C or E, these 
vendors give her value of $1.50 ($2.00 - 50 cents for 50 yards) for 
$1.00; and vendors B and F give her value of $1.00 ($2.00 - $1.00 
for 100 yards) for her $1.00, thus depriving her of all consumers' 
surplus but nevertheless leaving her willing to purchase a hot dog. 
                                                                                                                            
Buccirossi, ed., MIT Press, 2008) (excellent, but quite technical, discussion); Michael 
Baye, Market Definition and Unilateral Competitive Effects in Online Retail Markets, 4 J. 
Comp. L. & Econ. 639 (2008); Jeffrey Church & Roger Ware, Industrial Organization: A 
Strategic Approach §4.2 (2000); David T. Scheffman & Mary Coleman, Quantitative 
Analyses of Potential Competitive Effects from a Merger (June 9, 2003, available at 
www.ftc.gov); Thomas Campbell, Predation and Competition in Antitrust: The Case of 
Nonfungible Goods, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1625 (1987). 
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Also observe that in this setting each of the firms has a range of “ 
captured” or preferred customers of 50 yards, or 25 yards on either 
side, which is half-way to the next vendor. That is, a customer 
located 20 yards to the left of vendor B would be 30 yards from 
vendor A. Vendor B could charge that customer a price as much as 
10 cents higher than vendor A could and still make the sale. 
However, the vendors are unable to price-discriminate; they must 
charge all hot dog buyers the same price. Furthermore, they are all 
in the same position,2
Suppose that vendors C and D should merge, while leaving their 
stands (or “plants”) in the same location.  The assumption that they 
leave their stands in the same place is critical for now, but must be 
relaxed later when we consider the possibility that firms will 
reposition their offerings in response to the merger.  In the example, 
it should be clear that the two vendors together will be able to charge 
a significantly higher price than when they were competing. For 
example, considering the customers sunbathing between C and D, 
the new firm CD has at least a 50-cent (50-yard) advantage over 
vendors B and E, both of whom are at least 50 yards more remote. 
Considering this group of customers alone, CD could increase its 
price to $1.50 without losing any of them to either B or E. 
Furthermore, the range of customers located between former C and 
D is a full 50 yards, the same as the range of individual firms' 
preferred customers before the merger. In sum, this merger would 
very likely facilitate a significant price increase, perhaps by as much 
as 30 or 40 cents.
 and in this “equilibrium” situation they all 
charge a price of $1.00. 
3
Furthermore, (1) this price increase could be assessed by firm 
CD even though post-merger firm CD had a market share of only 8 
percent or so (assuming 25 equal-size vendors prior to the merger 
and that the beach itself was the smallest relevant market). Still 
further, (2) although firm CD would be able to assess this significant 
price increase, for the most part other firms in the market would not 
be able to do so. The exception would be firms B and E, who are 
adjacent to CD on each side. They may be able to respond to CD's 
 
                                                 
2 Actually, they are all in the same position except for the two vendors at the end 
points, who have somewhat greater power because they face competition from only one 
side rather than two. 
3 The firm would probably not increase its price by 50 cents because it would lose too 
many of the sales to customers located between B and CD on the left, and E and CD on the 
right. Rather, it would compute a price increase that maximized net gains. Depending on 
how customers were arrayed, this might be a price of, say, $1.30. 
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price increase by increasing their own prices somewhat, although not 
as much as CD. 
Observe also that CD's ability to increase its price by these 
magnitudes meets all the criteria for defining CD's output as a 
relevant market unto itself. That is, the merger has put CD into a 
position such that the elasticity of demand facing it is sufficiently low 
that CD can reduce output and charge a price significantly above its 
costs. For example, a cartel of C and D would achieve the same 
result. We often define markets by considering the range of firms that 
are capable of fixing prices.4
Thus there must be a significant number of customers who 
regard the products of the two merging firms as their preferred 
market choices.
 
Further, the significant increase in power occurs only because the 
CD merger united two firms that were either adjacent or quite close 
together in the beach/hot dog market. If two remote firms, such as A 
and E, had merged, leaving three competitors between them, these 
price effects would not occur. As we shall see later, unilateral effects 
theories do not require that the output of the two merging firms be 
the closest possible substitutes for one another. Nevertheless, they 
must be regarded by customers as reasonably close substitutes. 
While the story is somewhat more abstract when the firms are 
spread out in product space rather than geographic space, the 
principle is no different. The degree to which a merger in a product-
differentiated market might facilitate a unilateral price increase 
depends on (1) the relative “closeness” in product space of the 
merging firms to one another; (2) the relative distance between the 
post-merger firm's product offering and the offerings of others in the 
market; and (3) the relative inability of other firms to redesign their 
products to make them close to the output of the merging firms. 
5
                                                 
4 See 2B Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶530a (3d ed. 2008) 
(hereinafter “Antitrust Law”); and see Gregory J. Werden, the 1982 Merger Guidelines and 
the Ascent of the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm, 71 Antitrust L.J. 253, 255-256, 262-
263(2003) (developing history and analytic defense of proposition that relevant market 
consists of a “collusive group,” or smallest grouping of firms capable of colluding 
profitably with one another).  See also Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, A Practical 
Guide to the Hypothetical Monopolist Test for Market Definition, 4 J.Comp. L. & Econ. 
1031 (2008). 
5 See Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 1992 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines §2.21. These Guidelines are reprinted in Appendix A of the Supplement. 
  In Whole Foods the FTC and later the D.C. Circuit 
distinguished between “marginal” customers, who would shop the 
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lowest price, and “core” customers who would be loyal to high end 
natural food stores even after a price increase.6  Whether the latter 
group was significant enough to make a price increase profitable 
presented an empirical question.  The closer the products made by 
the two merging firms, the more likely that the merger will produce a 
substantial price increase.7 Further, something must prevent other 
firms in the market from repositioning their output to make it more 
like that of the merging firms, thus enabling them to take advantage 
of the price increase. 
Figure B illustrates a unilateral effects merger in a product-
differentiated market. Suppose this market has six firms, A through 
F, making a differentiated product.  That is, the products of all six 
firms compete with one another, but different customers prefer the 
products of different firms.  For some the preferences are strong; for 
others they are weaker.  Further, different customers have different 
rankings of first, second, and third choices, and so on.  Assume that 
A's marginal cost is $1.00, its current price is $2.00, and at that price 
it sells 100 units. Its residual price elasticity of demand is -2, which 
means that a 10 percent price increase, to $2.20, will yield a 20 
percent demand reduction, to 80 units. Note that this price increase 
is unprofitable. Pre-increase profits were $100, but post-increase 
profits are $1.20 per unit, times 80 units, or $96. 
 
 
                                                 
6 FTC v. Whole Foods Markets, Inc. , 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
7 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines at §2.211. 
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But consider where the customers go when firm A raises its price. 
Assume that of the 20 units that are lost, 8 (40%) go to B, the closest 
rival, 5 (25%) go to C, the second closest rival, and 3, 3 and 1 units 
respectively, go to rivals D, E and F. This percentage rate at which 
customers substitute from A to B or from A to C, is called a “diversion 
ratio.”8
In this case an AC merger would make the price increase 
profitable, even though C is not A’s “closest” rival.
 Assume also that all rivals have the same costs. 
9
Of course, a merger between A and C in the above situation 
would almost certainly permit firm B to increase its prices as well, 
given that it is an even closer substitute for A than C is.  For 
example, suppose that the automobile market contains three brands 
 While the price 
increase to $2.20 reduces A's own profits by $4.00, it increases C's 
profits by $5.00 (that is,C sells 5 more at a profit of $1.00 each). A 
merger with B would be even more profitable, since 8 sales, and 
$8.00 in increased profit, go to B. But the important point is that a 
merger with either B or C would make A's 10 percent price increase 
profitable, even though C is only the second closest rival. Thus either 
merger would be challengeable if we regarded a merger facilitating a 
10 percent price increase as unlawful. 
                                                 
8 See Jonathan B. Baker, Contemporary Empirical Merger Analysis, 5 Geo. Mason L. 
Rev. 347 (1997); Jonathan B. Baker, Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories in Merger 
Analysis, 11 Antitrust 21(Spring 1997); Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated 
Products, 10 Antitrust 23, 24 (Spring 1996); see also Christopher A. Vellturo, Evaluating 
Mergers with Differentiated Products, 11 Antitrust 16 (Spring 1997). See also Gregory J. 
Werden & Luke M. Froeb, The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: 
Structural Merger Policy and the Logit Model, 10 J.L. Econ. & Organ. 407 (1994); 
Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, The Gains from Merger or Collusion in 
Product-Differentiated Industries, 33 J. Indus. Econ. 427 (1985). See also Gregory J. 
Werden, Simulating Unilateral Competitive Effects from Differentiated Products Mergers, 
11 Antitrust 27 (Spring 1997); Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Economic 
Analysis of Differentiated Products Mergers Using Real World Data, 5 Geo. Mason L. 
Rev. 321 (1997). 
9 See the Government’s Commentary: 
A merger may produce significant unilateral effects even though a non-
merging product is the “closest” substitute for every merging product in the sense 
that the largest diversion ratio for every product of the merged firm is to a non-
merging firm’s product. The unilateral effects of a merger of differentiated 
consumer products are largely determined by the diversion ratios between pairs of 
products combined by the merger, and the diversion ratios between those products 
and the products of non-merging firms have at most a secondary effect. 
Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, Commentary on the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines 28 (2006). Available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/03/ 
CommentaryontheHorizontalMergerGuidelinesMarch2006.pdf 
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of luxury cars that compete quite intensely among themselves for a 
certain class of customers, and compete to a considerably lesser 
degree with other automobiles.  The three brands are Mercedes, 
BMW, and Lexus.  Of these, Mercedes and BMW are the closest 
substitutes, which simply means that if Mercedes were to increase its 
price unilaterally more of the customers who substituted away from 
Mercedes would go to BMW than would go to Lexus.  However, a 
merger of Mercedes and Lexus could still effect a price increase.  
But in that case BMW would operate under the price umbrella of its 
nearest rival, which would be the newly merged Mercedes/Lexus 
firm.  Given the relative weakness of its competition with other 
manufacturers it would almost certainly profit by increasing its own 
prices as well.  So ultimately this analysis differs very little from 
saying that the grouping of sales covered by Mercedes, BMW and 
Lexus constitutes a relevant market unto itself, and a merger of any 
two firms within this market would very likely lead to the feared price 
increase. 
Significantly, these price increases might be profitable even if 
rivals responded to the price increase by increasing their own output. 
That is, we speak of the effects as “unilateral” because the 
profitability of the merger does not depend on any notion that it 
facilitates collusion by enabling nonmerging firms to reduce their own 
output as well. All things being equal, the bigger the market share of 
the post-merger firm vis-à-vis nonmerging firms, the more resistant it 
will be to output increases by rivals. For this reason the theory is 
most robust when the post-merger firm has a significant market 
share, in the range of 35 percent or more.  The Government’s 
Commentary on the Merger Guidelines reveals that as an empirical 
matter the Agencies’ unilateral effects challenges “nearly always 
have involved combined shares greater than 35%.”10
Combined shares less than 35% may be sufficiently high to 
produce a substantial unilateral anticompetitive effect if the 
products are differentiated and the merging products are 
especially close substitutes or if the product is undifferentiated 
and the non-merging firms are capacity constrained.
  The 
Commentary then adds: 
11
Measuring diversion ratios is often a fairly matter of tracing 
consumer substitution from electronic scanners or similar data. For 
 
                                                 
10Id. at 26. 
11 Ibid. 
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example, if a sporting goods store sells several brands of running 
shoes and the price of Adidas rises by 10 percent, scanner data 
might reveal the number of customers who switched away from 
Adidas, and the relative numbers that switched to Nike, Saucony, 
Asics, and so on. 
“Critical loss analysis” refers to the empirical determination 
whether a price increase of a given magnitude is profitable by 
comparing the gains from higher prices against the losses that result 
from loss of volume.12  For example, in a case such as Whole Foods 
the question is whether after the merger the natural foods grocer 
would be able to profit by increasing price substantially.13  In 
response to a price increase of a given magnitude a certain group of 
loyal, or “core,” customers would pay more; other, more “marginal” 
customers would abandon the Whole Foods chain in favor of more 
general line grocery chains that were also increasingly carrying 
natural foods items.  If the increased profits that Whole Foods 
increased from the loyal core group of customers was greater than 
the revenue that it lost from the price sensitive marginal customers, 
and if this price increase were of sufficient magnitude, then the price 
increase would be profitable and the narrower market definition 
appropriate.14
                                                 
12 See Barry Harris and Joseph Simmons, Focusing Market Definition: How Much 
Substitution is Enough, 12 Res. L. & Econ. 207 (1989); Baniel P. O’Brien and Abraham L. 
Wickelgren, A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis (FTC Working Paper, May 23, 
2003), available at 
 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp254.pdf. 
13 FTC v. Whole Foods Markets, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  On critical loss 
analysis and the Whole Foods case, see Carlton Varner & Heather Cooper, Product 
Markets in Merger Cases: The Whole Foods Decision, Antitrust Source (Oct. 2007), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/07/10/Oct07-Varner.pdf; and Joseph 
Farrell and Carl Shapiro, Improving Critical Loss Analysis, Antitrust Source (Feb. 2008), 
available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/critical2008.pdf.  See also Kevin 
Murphy and Robert Topel, Critical Loss Analysis in the Whole Foods Case, Global 
Competition Policy (March 17, 2008). 
14 On the use of critical loss analysis to assess mergers, see Joseph Farrell and Carl 
Shapiro, Improving Critical Loss Analysis, 2008 The Antitrust Source 1 (Feb. 2008), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/08/02/Feb08-Farrell-Shapiro.pdf;  
Malcolm B. Coate and Joseph J. Simons, Models, Mathematics and Critical Loss (FTC, 
working paper, Feb. 18, 2009, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1346067; Malcolm B. Coate and 
Jeffrey H. Fischer, A Practical Guide to the Hypothetical Monopolist Test for Market 
Definition, 4 J.Comp. L. & Econ. 1031 (2008).  For a good and balanced critique, see 
Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytic Overview, 74 Antitrust L. J. 129 
(2007).  Other good discussions include Daniel P. O'Brien & Abraham L. Wickelgren, A 
Critical Analysis of Critical Loss Analysis, 71 Antitrust L.J. 161 (2003); Michael L. Katz 
& Carl Shapiro, Critical Loss: Let's Tell the Whole Story, Antitrust 49 (Spring 2003); 
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Critical loss analysis begins with a price increase of a given 
magnitude, and then consider how many sales must be lost before 
this particular price increase would become unprofitable.  Then it 
considers whether the actual level of sales lost in response to a 
given price increase exceeds the critical level.15  If the actual level is 
greater than the critical level, then the price increase is unprofitable 
and the market must be drawn more broadly.  In some cases a large 
price increase might be profitable while a smaller one would not be; 
in others a small increase might be profitable while a larger one 
would not be.16
Critical loss analysis can yield the anomaly that it tends to 
indicate larger markets (and thus less market power) when price/cost 
margins are high.
  In most cases the merger in question has not 
occurred.  As a result the merger must be “simulated,” with the 
relevant losses estimated from demand elasticities. 
While simplified and artificial, the foregoing illustrations 
nevertheless make an important point. In differentiated markets 
mergers between firms making “adjacent” or similar product 
variations can have a much more significant anticompetitive effect 
than mergers between firms making more remote products. The 
differentiations can apply to both spatial location, as in the hot dog 
vendor illustration, and to product specification or design. 
 
17
                                                                                                                            
James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Critical Loss Analysis in Evaluating Mergers, 
46 Antitrust Bull. 299 (2001); Dennis W. Carlton, Using Economics to Improve Antitrust 
Policy, 2004 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 283 (2004); Gregory J. Werden, Beyond Critical Loss: 
Tailoring Applications of the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm, 4 Competition L.J. 69 
(2005); Kenneth L. Danger & H.E. Frech III, Critical Thinking About “Critical Loss” in 
Antitrust, 46 Antitrust Bull. 339 (2001). 
15 See City of New York v. Group Health, Inc., 2008 WL 4974578 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 
2008) (critical loss analysis relevant to determination of amount of price increase that 
would likely occur subsequent to a merger); Delco LLC v. Giant of Maryland, LLC, 2007 
WL 3307018 (D.N.J. Nov. 8, 2008) (similar). 
16 See Gregory Werden, Market Delineation and the Justice Department’s Merger 
Guidelines, 1983 Duke L.J. 514 (1983).  Cf., e.g., California v. Sutter Health Sys., 130 
F.Supp.2d 1109, 1129 (C.D.Cal. 2001) (erroneously concluding that the only relevant price 
increase to be considered was the 5 percent increase suggested in the Guidelines; this could 
lead to the perverse result that a merger would be exonerated because the post-merger 
firm’s 5% price increase would be unprofitable, even though a 10% price increase would 
be profitable).  On the latter point, see Gregory J. Werden, Beyond Critical Loss: Tailoring 
Applications of the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm, 4 Competition L.J. 69 (2005). 
17 See, e.g., FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F.Supp.2d 151 (D.D.C. 2000) (ultimately 
finding narrower market in case of high price/cost margins). 
  In such cases the loss of relatively few 
customers can be quite costly, indicating that fewer customer 
10 UNILATERAL EFFECTS MERGER ANALYSIS 20-Mar-09 
substitutions are necessary to achieve the “critical” amount of loss. 18 
But the other side is that margins might be high because the firms 
are already charging monopoly prices, indicating that the market 
should be defined narrowly.19 In sum, a version of the “Cellophane 
Fallacy” can be implicit in critical loss analysis, as it is in market 
delineation under the Merger Guidelines generally.20
Although the price effects of such mergers are often said to be 
“unilateral,” other firms in the market may be able to increase their 
own prices as well. In the case of ordinary concentration increasing 
mergers facilitating coordinated interaction,
  That is, the 
approach may reflect the fact that the firms are already charging a 
profit-maximizing price that is significantly above their costs.  Indeed, 
if two firms that are very close to one another in product space are 
behaving as a perfect cartel, which charges the same price as a 
monopoly, then a merger of the two would not affect their price at all.  
They would go right on charging the monopoly price.  Nevertheless, 
we would never permit such a merger because the two-person 
(duopoly) situation is inherently less stable than the monopoly 
situation, and later on proof of an unlawful agreement might be 
established.  As a result opportunities exist to apply the antitrust laws 
to the two firm situation that will be lost once the merger has united 
them into a single firm. 
21
                                                 
18 See Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytic Overview, 74 Antitrust L. J. 
129, 155-156 (2007). 
 we generally say that 
every firm in the market experiences the resulting price increase, 
whether or not the firm was involved in the merger. At the opposite 
extreme—when a merger creates an absolute monopoly—the post-
merger firm is the only one to enjoy the price increase. In this 
intermediate case, the fact of product differentiation plus the product 
or geographic proximity of the two merging firms means that they will 
enjoy a significant price increase. But, depending on the situation, 
some of the remaining firms may be able to increase their prices as 
19  See Daniel P. O'Brien & Abraham L. Wickelgren, A Critical Analysis of Critical 
Loss Analysis, 71 Antitrust L.J. 161 (2003); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Critical Loss: 
Let's Tell the Whole Story, Antitrust, Spring 2003, at 49; James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, 
Critical Loss Analysis in Evaluating Mergers, 46 Antitrust Bull. 299 (2001); Dennis W. 
Carlton, Using Economics to Improve Antitrust Policy, 2004 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 283 
(2004). 
20 On the Cellophane fallacy, see 2B Antitrust Law ¶539 (3d ed. 2008).  See Gregory 
J. Werden, Beyond Critical Loss: Tailoring Applications of the Hypothetical Monopolist 
Paradigm, 4 Competition L.J. 69 (2005), which also discusses other problems with the 
critical loss technique. 
21 See 4 Antitrust Law, Ch. 9B-2. 
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well, although by a smaller amount. This is because, while their 
products are relatively distinguishable from those of the merging 
firms, the firms were nevertheless in the same market to begin with, 
so the substitution rate among them is nevertheless significant. As a 
result, a significant price increase by the post-merger firm reduces 
competitive pressures on other firms as well, depending on their 
degree of “ remoteness” from the post-merger firm's output. Thus, for 
example, the post-merger firm might be able to increase its 
priceby10 percent, while other firms in the market exact price 
increases of, say, 1 to 3 percent, depending on how proximate their 
output is to that of the post-merger firm.22
In Evanston the FTC found that a previously consummated 
merger among two hospitals substantially lessened competition 
based largely on the fact that prices actually rose subsequent to the 
merger.
 
23 The price increases were found to result from the unilateral 
effect of limiting competition between two closely placed hospitals in 
a diverse greater–Chicago market. The court rejected the proposition 
that a unilateral effects theory could apply only if the merging firms 
were the closest substitutes for the product in question, noting that a 
merger between one firm and even its second- or third-closest 
substitute could result in an unacceptable price increase.24 This 
would be tantamount to a conclusion that a relevant market exists for 
the output of the two merging firms.25
In any event, measurement of diversion of customers seems 
 
In this case there was undisputed evidence that the post-merger 
firm immediately raised prices subsequent to the merger, and the 
Commission rejected the hospital's explanation that it did so only 
because it had previously been ignorant about demand and had 
undercharged certain classes of customers. The FTC accepted 
regression analyses offered by its experts that related these price 
increases to the structural effects of the merger rather than to 
competitively “benign” factors. 
                                                 
22 For example, in Figure B, supra, if firms A and C merged and increased their post-
merger price, firm B would very likely then be able to increase its price as well, given that 
its closest rival A was now charging a higher price.  
23 Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., 2007 WL 2286195 (F.T.C., Aug. 6, 2007) 
(to the extent it is relevant, H.H. was consulted by the defendant). 
24 Id., citing 4 Antitrust Law ¶914h (2d ed. 2004). 
25 Id., citing Gregory J. Werden, Simulating the Effects of Differentiated Product 
Mergers: A Practical Alternative to Structural Merger Policy, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 363, 
384 & n.97 (1997). 
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essential to the analysis. In Oracle the court observed that the 
government had failed to produce evidence of customer diversion 
ratios.26 For its part, the government argued that the market was 
characterized by a high degree of price discrimination, making such 
numbers difficult to produce or meaningless when they were 
produced. The court was not persuaded. It noted that without such 
evidence there was insufficient proof of “localized competition” 
between Oracle and Peoplesoft, the merging firms.27 In sum, without 
diversion ratio evidence one could not determine how much Oracle 
and Peoplesoft competed with each other, nor, how little either of 
these firms competed with some third firm. That argument seems 
weighty in a situation where the basis for challenging the merger is 
that the quantum of competition between the merging firms is high, 
while that between the merging firms and other firms is low.  At the 
same time, however, the court erred in concluding that before the 
government could prevail on its unilateral effects claim it had to 
prove “a relevant market in which the merging parties would have 
essentially a monopoly or dominant position….”28
 A formal market definition is literally unnecessary to an 
economist’s prediction whether a merger in a product differentiated 
market will facilitate a unilateral price increase.  Formulas can be 
devised for predicting the impact of a post-merger price increase that 
do not depend on a formal market definition.
  While a dominant 
position is necessary for monopolization, the concern of merger law 
is impermissible price increases, something which can be achieved 
on far lower market shares. 
 
Is market definition necessary? 
29
                                                 
26 United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004).  
27 Id. at 1117.  See also United States v. Sungard Data Sys., Inc., 172 F.Supp.2d 172 
(D.D.C. 2001) (government’s market too narrowly drawn). 
28 Id. at 1123. 
  At the same time, the 
29 See Carl Shapiro & Joseph Farrell, Mergers with Unilateral Effects: A Simpler and 
More Accurate Alternative to Market Definition (FTC, Feb. 12, 2008), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/unilateral/docs/shapiro.pdf.  The authors develop this formula for 
assessing whether such a merger will result in upward pricing pressure: 
 
D21 (P2 – C2) > ℮C1 
Where, 
 
   D21 = the Diversion Ratio from Product 2 to Product 1 
   P2 =  Pre-merger price of product 2 
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case law seems quite clearly to require a market definition.30
It may also be the case that the post-merger “relevant market” is 
narrower than any observed pre-merger market.  For example, 
suppose we were to define a relevant market as a grouping of sales 
for which a firm or firms could collectively and profitably hold price at 
10 percent above cost.  It is quite possible that firms B and D in a 
field of A,B,C,D & E would not be able to sustain such a price as long 
as they were competing with one another.  As a result we would say 
that the output of B and D does not constitute a relevant market, but 
that perhaps the relevant market includes all five firms.
 
But these differences are more of rhetoric than of substance.  
Economists often measure market power by looking at elasticities, 
and use the term “relevant market” only because the legal policy so 
requires.  In a unilateral effects merger case the query is whether the 
post-merger firm will be able to raise its price to an unacceptable 
level (say, 5 percent to 10 percent above current prices or, in some 
cases, above the competitive price) for an unacceptable period of 
time.  If that is the case then it clearly follows that a “grouping of 
sales” exists in which such a price increase is plausible.  That 
grouping may consist of the two merging firms, or it may consist of 
the two merging firms plus a few others that are reasonably adjacent 
in product space.  In all events, to speak of this post-merger 
grouping as a “relevant market” is both sensible and quite 
conventional within antitrust. 
31
                                                                                                                            
   C2 = Marginal Cost of Product 2 
  After the 
merger, however, B and D are no longer constrained by one 
another’s prices and the feared price increase may be possible.  At 
that point it would become appropriate to say that the output of B and 
D is itself a relevant market; or perhaps alternatively that the market 
consists of the output of B, C & D, with C being a firm that is also 
located very close to B and D in product space.  
   C1 = Marginal cost of Product 1 
   ℮ = credit for merger efficiencies 
 
 The formula requires knowledge of both the price and marginal cost of product 2, 
a number which already provides considerable information about that product’s power. 
30 See, e.g., FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548F.3d 1028, 1040 (D.C. Cir.  2008).  
See also United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963) (requiring 
proof of “a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market”); followed 
in FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
31 Although a cartel of B, C and D might still be able to raise prices to an unacceptable 
level. 
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This result is not inconsistent with the case law.  For example, 
Philadelphia Bank assessed this requirement: 
Specifically, we think that a merger which produces a firm 
controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, 
and results in a significant increase in the concentration of 
firms in that market is so inherently likely to lessen 
competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the 
absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not 
likely to have such anticompetitive effects.32
 For the time being at least, the courts remain insistent on a 
market definition in a merger case and the quoted language from 
Philadelphia Bank appears to restrain the lower courts from doing 
otherwise.  But the concept of a relevant market is surely flexible 
enough to permit the courts to identify a “relevant market” while 
economists use their own tools of measurement to predict whether a 
merger will yield an unacceptable price increase above marginal 
cost.  As Landes and Posner observed already in 1981 the concept 
of a relevant market for all forms of antitrust analysis, including 
mergers, is entirely dependent on the elasticities of supply and 
demand that a firm faces.
 
Clearly, the reference to a merger that “produces” a firm that controls 
an “undue percentage share of the relevant market” is a reference to 
the situation that exists subsequent to the merger.  Quite consistently 
with Philadelphia Bank, one can conclude the merger facilitated an 
unacceptable price increase among a narrower grouping of firms, 
which is therefore appropriately described as a relevant market. 
33
                                                 
32 Philadelphia Bank, 374 U.S. at 363. 
33 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 
Harv. L. Rev.  937, 962 (1981): 
  A unilateral effects merger that yields an 
… market definition is important in determining whether a firm has market 
power (and how much it has) only because of the difficulty of measuring 
elasticities of demand and supply reliably. If we knew the elasticity of demand 
facing firm i, we could measure its market power directly … without troubling 
ourselves about what its market share was. Less obviously, if we could readily 
determine market elasticities of demand (but not firm elasticities of demand), we 
would not have to worry about how broadly or narrowly the market was 
defined…. If the market were defined broadly--that is, if distant as well as close 
substitutes for firm i's product were included in the market--i's market share would 
tend to be small, but the market elasticity of demand would also tend to be low; so 
many substitutes would be included in the market that consumers would have 
difficulty substituting away from the market if market price rose….  If instead the 
market were defined narrowly, the firm's market share would be larger but the 
effect on market power would be offset by the higher market elasticity of 
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unacceptable price increase is simply a merger that reduces the 
relevant elasticities facing the merging firm, thus permitting a 
narrower market definition.34
Indeed, one characteristic of unilateral effects merger cases in 
product differentiated markets is that the market boundaries 
themselves tend to be both uncertain and shifting.  The historical 
conception of a relevant market involved a grouping of firms that 
produced the “same” product, which was distinguishable from other 
firms that produced a “different” product.”  Product differentiation 
necessarily entails that competition among different firms within such 
a market is imperfect, and the degree of imperfection varies from one 
pair of firms to another.  Whether a yet further differentiated firm is 
inside or outside the market is entirely a matter of definition.  The 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that not only is the output of the 
firms differentiated, but both the product and the firms themselves 
may be subject to rapid technological change.
 
35
The Oracle court noted the great difficulty in defining relevant 
markets when there are gradations of substitutability between 
different firms, and the only difference between the substitutability of 
the products of the merging firms and that between the merging firms 
and outsiders is a relatively narrow one of degree. The Court then 
suggested “that strong presumptions based on mere market 
concentration may be ill-advised in differentiated products unilateral 
effects cases.”
  To the extent that 
firms continuously seek to differentiate their products these 
boundaries shift as a firm move closer to or further away from the 
product space of another firm. 
36
                                                                                                                            
demand…. 
34 This conception may revitalize a conception of “submarket,” but the two concepts 
are completely different and revitalization would lead to confusion.  See 2B Antitrust Law 
¶533 (3d ed. 2008).  See also Jonathan B. Baker, Stepping Out in an Old Brown Shoe: in 
Qualified Praise of Submarkets, 68 Antitrust L.J. 203 (2000). 
35 Michael L. Katz and Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74 Antitrust 
L.J. 1, 32-33 (2007); see also Michael L. Katz and Howard A. Shelanski, Merger Analysis 
and the Treatment of Uncertainty: Should we Expect Better, 74 Antitrust L.J. 537 (2007). 
36 Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1121 citing Roscoe B Starek III & Stephen Stockum, 
What Makes Mergers Anticompetitive?: “Unilateral Effects” Analysis Under the 1992 
Merger Guidelines, 63 Antitrust L.J. 801, 804 (1995); Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. 
Leonard, Economic Analysis of Differentiated Products Mergers Using Real World Data, 5 
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 321, 337-339 (1997); Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, The 
Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Structural Merger Policy and the 
Logit Model, 10 J.L. Econ. & Organ. 407, 413 (1994). 
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And given these constraints the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in 
Whole Foods seems to be about right -- faithful to both the 
economists’ analysis and also to the legal reality of Philadelphia 
Bank’s mandate that a relevant market must be identified in a merger 
case.37  The court rejected the FTC’s claim that a relevant market 
was unnecessary, but it recognized a plausible the claim that a 
narrower market for premium natural and organic supermarkets 
(PNOS), in which the merging firms were dominant.  The court 
unfortunately also used the term “submarket,”38
Anticompetitive effects dissipated by easy competitor mobility 
 but this usage was 
unnecessary to its analysis, because it concluded that the smaller 
market existed on the basis of traditional price increasing criteria that 
are used to identify relevant markets. 
 
The competitive effects of merger of hot dog vendors in the 
previous illustrations would quickly be dissipated if individual hot dog 
vendors could cheaply and quickly relocate their stands—for 
example, if all were mobile carts that could be moved at the vendor's 
will. In that case, when firms C and D merged and attempted a price 
increase of, say, 30 percent, we would expect firms A, B, E, F and 
perhaps others to move their carts closer into the CD territory in 
order to participate in these price increases. The effect would be to 
drive the prices back down toward the $1 level. The same thing 
could happen in the case of the merger in the product-differentiated 
market depending on how easily nonmerging firms could reconfigure 
their products to make them more closely resemble the merging 
firms' product. In sum, the threat of such a merger to produce 
anticompetitive results depends on the inability of other firms to 
respond by innovating or relocating into that portion of the market 
that has now become more competitive as a result of the merger. As 
the Oracle court put it: 
repositioning by the non-merging firms must be 
unlikely. In other words, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the non-merging firms are 
unlikely to introduce products sufficiently similar 
                                                 
37 FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1040 (D.C. Cir.  2008). 
38 Id. at 1039 (“The FTC's evidence delineated a PNOS submarket catering to a core 
group of customers who ‘have decided that natural and organic is important, lifestyle of 
health and ecological sustainability is important,’” quoting the district court, 502 F.Supp.2d 
at 23). 
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to the products controlled by the merging firms to 
eliminate any significant market power created 
by the merger.39
By contrast, in Whole Foods the FTC cited evidence that 
repositioning by conventional grocers to compete more 
closely with natural food stores would be difficult because 
by moving their offerings in this direction they would have 
to weaken their position vis-à-vis their core customers.
 
40  
The district court disagreed, and found significant 
repositioning.41  The D.C. Circuit cited this evidence as 
well, but did not find it conclusive.42
Merger to Monopoly? Early Railroad Merger Cases 
 
 
 
Is the merger of hot dog vendors illustrated previously any 
different from a conventional merger to monopoly? That question is 
largely one of market definition, as some of the early merger cases 
illustrate. For example Union Pacific was a government challenge to 
Union Pacific's acquisition of Southern Pacific, two large, 
predominantly east-west railroad systems that were adjacent to each 
other and that previously had competed along many routes.43
                                                 
39 Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1118.  See also id. at 1109: 
 As the 
assuming that localized product or geographic competition exists between Oracle and 
PeopleSoft, plaintiffs have not proved that SAP, Microsoft and Lawson would not be 
able to reposition themselves in the market so as to constrain an anticompetitive price 
increase or reduction in output by a post-merger Oracle. 
And see id. at 1135 (similar).  Likewise, in FTC v. Whole Foods Markets, Inc. , 548 F.3d 
1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008), a price increase by the post-merger firm would naturally induce the 
general grocery chains to reposition their own inventory so as to compete more closely 
with the natural food stores, where margins were higher; their ability to do so in a 
reasonable amount of time could be decisive in determining whether the merger would lead 
to an unacceptable price increase.  On the repositioning issue generally, see Yves 
Botteman, Mergers, Standard of Proof and Expert Economic Evidence, 2 J.Competition L. 
& Econ. 71 (2006); John Harkrider, Proving Anticompetitive Impact: Moving Past Merger 
Guidelines Presumptions, 2005 Col. Bus. L. Rev. 317, 325 (2005). 
40 The evidence is summaried in Deborah L. Feinstein and Michael B. Bernstein, All 
Over the Map: Grocery Store Enforcement from Von’s to Whole Foods, 22 Antitrust 52, 55 
(Fall, 2007). 
41 See F.T.C. v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 502 F.Supp.2d 1, 25 (D.D.C. 2008). 
42 548 F.3d at 1035. 
43 United States v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61 (1912); see also United States 
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Supreme Court noted, although there were alternatives for carrying 
railroad traffic from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Coast, the 
merger of these two railroads eliminated much of the closest 
competition.44
One way to view such a case is to see the geographic area 
covered by the Union Pacific and the Southern Pacific as a relevant 
market, and the merger as eliminating all competition between the 
only two participants in that market. Although modern market 
definition criteria had not yet been developed, this is apparently the 
perspective that the Court took. But in fact there were numerous 
competing lines, and the amount of competition varied depending on 
the origin and destination of the freight in question. What made the 
mergers anticompetitive is that they involved adjacent systems in the 
network, and the merger thus had the effect of isolating relatively 
more shipments from the competition of other lines. This was 
clearest in the Southern Pacific case. As the Court explained, when 
routing traffic originating on its lines the Southern Pacific—
presumably acting as most railroads would—attempted to keep the 
traffic completely on its own line rather than transferring to the line of 
another railroad.
 
45
Thus today we might look at the great railroad system merger 
cases as mergers in product-differentiated markets, with the 
differentiation resting entirely on geographic location. While the 
competing systems had many common points of interconnection and 
large cities were served by numerous systems, more isolated areas 
were typically served by a single system or perhaps two systems. As 
a result, competition ranged from fairly intense for long-haul rates 
between pairs of large cities, to almost nonexistent for short hauls 
between two relatively small towns.
 One of the lines it was most often forced to share 
was controlled by the Central Pacific. By acquiring the Central Pacific 
Southern Pacific was thus able to make a higher percentage of its 
lines noncompetitive. 
46
                                                                                                                            
v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922); Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 
U.S. 197 (1904). 
44 Union Pacific, 226 U.S. at 88-89. 
45 Southern Pacific, 259 U.S. at 231. 
46 The late nineteenth and early twentieth century system is described in more detail in 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad 
Problem, 97 Yale L.J. 1017-1072 (1988). 
 While modern market definition 
criteria might permit finding many individual routes to be relevant 
markets, the systems themselves might be found to be in significant 
competition with each other. But the merger of “adjacent” systems 
 Hovenkamp 19 
would have the effect of significantly reducing the amount of 
competition along numerous routes—thus increasing the number of 
routes on which monopoly price increases would not be disciplined 
by competition. 
 
Relative incidence of unilateral effects 
As the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines47 observe, product 
differentiation can make collusion or oligopoly far more difficult than it 
would be in a market where every firm's product was identical with 
everyone else's.48
By “significant,” we mean product differentiation that goes to fairly 
fundamental differences in product design, manufacturing costs, 
technology, or use of inputs.
 As a result, collusion is of relatively less concern 
in markets that are characterized by significant product 
differentiation. 
49
When product differentiation is significant, therefore, collusion 
becomes less likely, but mergers effecting unilateral price increases 
in specific segments of the product-differentiated market become 
 While many markets exhibit some 
degree of product differentiation, not all product differentiation is 
significant. For example, today even agricultural products are subject 
to branding, such as Chiquita and Del Monte bananas. Other 
products, such as ready-to-eat breakfast cereals, seem far more 
different on first appearance than they are in fact. While Kellogg's 
Frosted Flakes and Post's Alphabits might appear quite distinct, they 
are in fact made with common ingredients and common technology, 
with equipment that can be reconfigured to extrude different shapes 
or designs. And, of course, they are promoted differently. But leaving 
aside intellectual property rights, a firm making one could quite easily 
switch its production facilities to the manufacturing of the other. To 
this extent, costs are more or less the same, and collusion might be 
quite possible. 
                                                 
47 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 1992 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines §2.21 (reprinted in Appendix A of the Supplement). 
48 On the impact of production differentiation on collusion, see 12 Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶2002f2 (2d ed. 2005). 
49 See Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1120 (“Merely demonstrating that the merging 
parties' products are differentiated is not sufficient. Instead, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
product differentiation sufficient to sustain a small but significant and non-transitory price 
increase.”). 
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relatively more likely.50
Robustness; Conceptual Difficulties 
 
Analysis of unilateral effects in merger cases seems rather new, 
although the discussion of the early railroad merger cases indicates 
that at least some of the issues have been around for some time. In 
any event, this novelty should not be interpreted to mean that 
unilateral effects analysis is more speculative or less provable using 
econometric methodologies than other types of anticompetitive 
effects. Indeed, in a great many cases unilateral effects may be more 
readily capable of proof than is the likelihood of collusion,51
                                                 
50 Cf. State of New York v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 321, 352-358 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995), concluding that a merger of two ready-to-eat breakfast cereal 
manufacturers was unlikely to produce anticompetitive unilateral effects. The court noted 
mainly that the participants' Grape-Nuts and Shredded Wheat appealed to somewhat 
different groups of consumers, had been developed through different types of advertising 
campaigns, and had significant physical dissimilarities and different pricing structures. The 
Court then suggested that one could not easily or effectively supplant the other in the 
ready-to-eat cereal market. As a result, the evidence did not support the plaintiff's 
contention that Grape-Nuts and Shredded Wheat are the first and second choices of a 
significant percentage of cereal consumers. 
See also United States v. Gillette Co., 828 F. Supp. 78, 84 (D.D.C. 1993): 
 although 
the robustness of the conclusions depend critically on the availability 
[T]he evidence indicates that the market is awash with 
manufacturers and that the merger is unlikely to give the merged 
company the ability—unilaterally or collusively—to create anti-
competitive effects. … First, there is ample evidence that the 
merged company will not be able to increase prices on premium 
fountain pens unilaterally: There is ample evidence that fountain 
pens compete with other modes of writing. … [A]n increase in 
one type of pen will make it relatively less attractive than other 
types of pen. … In addition, given the competition between 
fountain pens and other modes of writing and the ease with 
which manufacturers may enter this wider market, Gillette will 
not be able to raise prices unilaterally on its premium fountain 
pens. 
51 See Jonathan B. Baker, Contemporary Empirical Merger Analysis, 5 Geo. Mason L. 
Rev. 347 (1997); Christopher A. Vellturo, Evaluating Mergers with Differentiated 
Products, 11 Antitrust 16 (Spring 1997).  As Vellturo notes, often the data necessary to 
estimate the “ diversion ratio,” or the extent to which customers respond to a price increase 
in product A by switching to product B, are more readily obtained than the data necessary 
to measure a relevant market and compute overall demand effects. To that extent such 
analysis can be more reliable than traditional market concentration analysis. For more 
technical discussions, see Werden & Froeb, 10 J.L. Econ. & Organ. 407; Baker & 
Bresnahan, 33 J. Indus. Econ.427; Werden, Simulating Unilateral Competitive Effects, 11 
Antitrust 27. 
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of data.52
Oligopoly theories are largely familiar to federal judges and 
antitrust lawyers, and they have been widely used in merger analysis 
for many years. But this familiarity belies their complexity and the 
many assumptions that attend any prediction of the price effects of a 
particular market structure. The pure theory, while elegant, depends 
on many simplifying assumptions
 
53 that rarely apply in real-world 
situations. As a result, empirical analysis by economists consists in 
large part of controlling for deviations. Thus, for example, the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines consider numerous factors that can 
vary the significance of a particular concentration level.54 While 
stating these factors is relatively easy, assigning weights to them and 
measuring their impact on the firms' collective ability to increase 
price can be extremely difficult. Further, as any economist knows, a 
“market share” is a relatively meaningless number unless 
accompanied by information concerning the cross-elasticities of 
demand and supply that the firms in the resulting market face.55
Applying these same criteria, measurement of unilateral effects 
 
However, the market definition/market share computation process 
that goes on in the typical antitrust case involves defining a market 
using fairly rough criteria and then treating all market share numbers 
of similar magnitude as meaning about the same thing. 
As a result, the predictions that the Merger Guidelines enable us 
to make on the basis of market share are often imprecise, providing 
relatively clear indications of anticompetitive effects in cases that are 
significantly over the thresholds, but less clear indications about 
marginal cases. Nevertheless, the case law has been willing to 
accommodate this uncertainty, and the language of Clayton Act §7 
seems to accept it. The statute does not require sure proof of price 
increases of a given magnitude; rather, it requires only reasonable 
evidence showing that the effect of a merger “may be” substantially 
to “lessen competition.” 
                                                 
52 See Hausman & Leonard, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 321. 
53 Briefly: perfectly fungible product, perfect information about the output of rivals, 
constant costs, no strategic behavior other than the immediate search for the output level at 
which marginal cost and marginal revenue are equal. 
54 1992 Merger Guidelines §2.11 (reprinted in Appendix A of the Supplement). 
55 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 
Harv. L. Rev. 937 (1981). Making the point forcefully in the defense of alternative 
econometric methodologies in unilateral effects merger cases is the Jerry A. Hausman & 
Gregory K. Leonard, Economic Analysis of Differentiated Products Mergers Using Real 
World Data, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 321 (1997). 
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with modern econometric tools is very likely no less speculative and 
probably more manageable when appropriate data are available.56
At the same time, unilateral effects merger theories face some 
significant difficulties.
  
Predicting behavior may be a more manageable exercise because 
fewer firms have to be taken into account. In the ordinary collusion 
facilitation case one must at least theoretically anticipate the 
behavior of every firm in the post-merger market. In the typical 
unilateral effects case, by contrast, the concern is with the behavior 
of the merger participants plus the relative position and capacity of 
“adjacent” firms. 
Needless to say, however, the methodologies are technical and 
require the use of an expert trained in empirical economic analysis. 
57 One problem in estimating unilateral effects 
is that retail pricing data used alone can exaggerate the 
anticompetitive effects of mergers by focusing exclusively on the 
demand side of the market.58 Suppose Beech-Nut and Gerber are 
relatively close substitutes making “premium” baby food and decide 
to merge. Scanner data indicates that these firms are close 
substitutes for each other but that Heinz, which makes a lower-priced 
brand, is more removed. As a result, the data suggest that a price 
increase will result from the Beech-Nut and Gerber merger. But the 
scanner data provide information only about customers' immediate 
responses to price variations among the three brands. The data say 
nothing about whether Heinz would be in a position to modify its 
product so as to compete in the premium market niche itself. Nor do 
they say anything about grocers' ability to respond to a price 
increase in premium baby food by reallocating more shelf space to 
lower-priced brands. Excessive reliance on short-run consumer 
behavior undoubtedly provides an exaggerated picture to the extent 
that consumer choice is only one of many avenues along which 
substitution among products occurs.59
                                                 
56 See especially Carl Shapiro & Joseph Farrell, Mergers with Unilateral Effects: A 
Simpler and More Accurate Alternative to Market Definition (FTC, Feb. 12, 2008), 
available at 
 Before consumer data tell us 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/unilateral/docs/shapiro.pdf;  Jonathan Baker, 
Contemporary Empirical Merger Analysis,  5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. at 347, noting that direct 
measure of demand elasticities is often a more reliable mechanism for assessing power than 
assessments of relevant market and market share. 
57 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution, ch. 9 
(2005). See also Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1098, which noted many difficulties. 
58 This is can be the case of critical loss analysis, which tends to focus on consumer 
behavior rather than supplier substitution. 
59 See Edward J. Lopez, New Anti-Merger Theories: A Critique, 20 Cato J. #3(Winter 
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reliably that a merger between two makers of similar products is 
anticompetitive, we also need to have fairly reliable information about 
how other firms in the market are likely to respond to the market 
shifts caused by the merger.60
A second problem with unilateral effects theories is more 
conceptual. The theory postulates a single relevant market that 
under the Merger Guidelines must be well defined. This means that 
the goods in it must be reasonably good substitutes for each other. 
The unilateral effects theory then postulates that the output of the 
two merging firms is particularly close, while the output of 
nonmerging firms is sufficiently distinct that they cannot discipline a 
higher price charged by the merging firms. Returning to the previous 
example of a market containing firms A through F and a merger 
between C and D, why is it that firms A, B, E, and F are unable to 
respond to the CD price increase? If they cannot make such a 
response, then it seems reasonable to conclude that they were 
improperly included in this market to begin with. But if the market 
was really limited to firms C and D, then we have a simple merger to 
monopoly, which does not require any “unilateral effects” theory to 
analyze.
 
61
Criteria for Identifying Likelihood of Unilateral Price Increase 
 
A merger in a product-differentiated market is more likely to result 
in a unilateral price increase as: 
(1) the products of the two merger participants are relatively 
similar to one another; 
(2) the products of the two merger participants are more 
different from the products produced by most other firms in 
the market that are not participating in the merger, 
although one or two may be equally or more similar; and 
(3) nonparticipants are unable readily to alter or reconfigure 
their products to make them more nearly like the products 
of the merger participants. 
To the extent that such a merger enables the post-merger firm 
profitably to assess a significant price increase without losing sales 
                                                                                                                            
2001). 
60 On this point, see Timothy J. Muris, The Government and Merger Efficiencies: Still 
Hostile After All These Years, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 729, 739-740 (1999). 
61 On mergers to monopoly, see 4 Antitrust Law ¶911 (3d ed. 2009). 
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to other firms, we would say that the merger facilitates the 
emergence of a new grouping of sales, or relevant market, in which 
the merging firms have either a monopoly or else a dominant 
share.62
In assessing the first criterion with respect to any merger, we 
might ask whether the two merging firms produce any products that 
would be the first and second choices of consumers in that market, 
considering pre-merger prices.
 
63
Suppose the econometric evidence indicates that a 10 percent 
pre-merger price increase in A2 would have been unprofitable 
because a significant number of A2's customers would have 
substituted A3—that is, the diversion ratio between A2 and A3 is 
high.
 Thus, for example, suppose the 
merging firms both manufacture differentiated product A, whose 
variations are expressed as A1, A2, A3, A4, … An. In this case, let 
us suppose that the acquiring firm produces variation A2 and the 
acquired firm produces a fairly close variation, A3. Further, for a 
significant group of consumers A2 is the first choice at pre-merger 
prices, while A3 would be the second choice. The competition 
between the manufacturers of A2 and A3 can be said to be more 
intense for the patronage of these customers than the competition 
between the makers of such pairings as A2 and A6, or A3 and A1. 
64
                                                 
62 Accord, Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1118 (citing this paragraph in the previous 
edition). 
63 See Shapiro, 10 Antitrust at 24. 
64 The diversion ratio expresses the extent to which buyers of the acquiring firm will 
substitute the good of the acquired firm, or vice versa, not the degree of substitution 
generally, which is the same as cross-price elasticity of demand. For an empirical critique, 
see Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Economic Analysis of Differentiated 
Products Mergers Using Real World Data, 5 Geo. Mason J. Rev. 321 (1997). 
To illustrate, suppose that the evidence indicates that in response to a 10 percent price 
increase, 60 percent of the customers of A2 will substitute away, but they will go in roughly 
equal numbers to A1, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7 and A8. In that case it is clear that the 
manufacturers of all of these variations are in close competition with A2 and eliminating A3 
as a rival will still leave all the others, suggesting that a significant price increase would 
still be unprofitable. 
By contrast, if the evidence suggests that in response to A2's 10 percent price increase 
60 percent of the customers would substitute away but two-thirds of these would purchase 
A3, then the A2/A3 merger would eliminate this option for these customers, who might then 
pay the higher price rather than substitute to A1, A4, or others. 
 After the merger, however, a 10 percent price increase in 
combined A2/A3 would be undermined only by substitutions of third 
or fourth choices, such as A1 or A4. If the relative difference in 
consumer preferences for A1 or A4 is significantly greater than the 
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relative difference between A2 and A3 had been, then this combined 
10 percent price increase in A2/A3 could be quite profitable, even 
though the increase in A2 alone would not have been. As suggested 
earlier, that conclusion could be expressed in conventional antitrust 
terms by saying that the post-merger grouping A2/A3 is a relevant 
market that the post-merger firm now dominates, although the 
sufficiently similar output of other firms must be included as well. 
Significantly, a cartel of A2 and A3 would also have been profitable. 
At this point, however, we can expect that the manufacturers of 
A1 and A4, and perhaps others, will try to compete for the higher 
profit sales made by the newly merged A2/A3 firm. If these 
manufacturers are like the mobile hot dog vendors in the previous 
illustration, then the post-merger price increase will not last very 
long. A1,A4, and perhaps other firms will immediately produce a 
product variation sufficiently resembling the A2/A3 variations that 
customers would rather purchase than pay the higher price.65
Interstate Bakers approved a consent decree requiring the 
merging wholesale bakers, Interstate and Continental, to divest 
certain brand labels.
 
66
The Complaint alleges that Interstate's 
acquisition of Continental would likely lead to an 
increase in price charged to consumers for white 
pan bread. Following the acquisition, Interstate 
likely would unilaterally raise the price of its own 
brands. … Because Interstate and Continental's 
brands are perceived by consumers as close 
substitutes, Interstate could pursue such a 
pricing strategy without losing so much in sales 
to competing white pan bread brands or to 
private labels that the price increase would be 
unprofitable. Interstate could, for instance, 
profitably impose a significant increase in the 
price of Wonder white pan bread, since a 
substantial portion of any sales lost for that 
product would be recaptured by increased sales 
of Interstate's other brands. 
 As the court described the allegations: 
Since many consumers consider Interstate 
                                                 
65 See Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1109, 1118 (noting this to be the case). 
66 United States v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., 1996-1 Trade Cas. ¶ 71,271  (N.D. Ill. 
1995). 
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and Continental brands to be closer substitutes 
than most other branded or private label white 
breads, the competitive discipline provided by 
rivals after the acquisition would be insufficient to 
prevent Interstate from significantly increasing 
the prices now being charged for Interstate and 
Continental branded white pan bread. Moreover, 
in response to Interstate's price increases, 
competing bakers would likely increase their 
prices of white pan bread.67
Government Guidelines 
 
Finally, the efficiencies defense elaborated in Subchapter 9E 
applies here as fully as in other types of merger cases. 
 
In determining whether to challenge mergers under this unilateral 
effects theory, the Merger Guidelines state that the enforcement 
agency will consider several factors. First, “Substantial unilateral 
price elevation in a market for differentiated products requires that 
there be a significant share of sales in the market accounted for by 
consumers who regard the products of the merging firms as their first 
and second choices, and that repositioning of the non-parties' 
product lines to replace the localized competition lost through the 
merger be unlikely.”68
Second, “The price rise will be greater the closer substitutes are 
to the products of the merging firms, i.e., the more the buyers of one 
product consider the other product to be their next choice.”
 
69
Third, although the general market concentration thresholds for 
challenging horizontal mergers do not apply so readily under this 
 
                                                 
67 Id. at 76,190. Cf. United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 1996-1 Trade Cas. ¶71,405 
(N.D. Tex. 1995) a judgment on a consent decree terminating a challenge to a merger that 
included two out of three major manufacturers of facial tissue. The acquiring firm, 
Kimberly-Clark, produced Kleenex, which dominated the market with a 48.5 percent share 
and was a lower-priced tissue. The acquired firm, Scott, produced Scotties, which had only 
a 7 percent share but was also aggressively priced, forcing Kleenex to be priced lower than 
it otherwise would be. Under the decree Kimberly-Clark agreed to divest the Scotties' 
brand and two out of four tissue mills. 
68 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, §2.21.  See Malcolm B. Coate, Unilateral 
Effects under the Guidelines: Models, Merits, and Merger Policy (FTC working paper, Oct. 
1, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1263474 
69 Guidelines, §2.211. 
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theory, as a rough generalization mergers will be subject to 
challenge where they fall outside the “safe harbor” provisions of 
those thresholds70
Fourth, as it is more difficult and costly for nonparticipants to the 
merger in the product-differentiated market to reconfigure their 
products so as to compete more directly with the post-merger firm, 
the competitive effects of the merger increase and challenge is more 
likely.
 and the market share of the merger participants 
exceeds 35 percent. This latter figure, it is noted, may overstate or 
understate the competitive significance of the merger, depending on 
the degree of similarity in the products of the two merging firms and 
their joint similarity to the products of others. 
71
Economics of Unilateral Effects 
 
While mergers between rival sellers can increase the likelihood of 
collusive behavior, they can also make it profitable for the merging 
firms to raise their prices without relying on a similar response by 
other firms in the market. This is particularly true in oligopolistic 
markets. Although the firms continue to choose their outputs and/or 
prices independently, the combination of two or more firms into one 
eliminates the constraints that each of the merging firms imposed on 
the others' choices, and the new equilibrium can deviate (further) 
from the competitive outcome. The extent to which these unilateral 
effects are likely to occur depends on the nature of the interaction 
among the firms in the market (including the behavior of potential 
entrants), the degree of substitutability among the firms' products 
and the relation between costs and outputs for the firms.  While the 
post-merger firm may not depend on the responses of others in 
increasing its own price, close rivals may be in a position to take 
advantage of the post-merger firm’s price increase, either to (1) 
increase their own prices; or (2) reposition their product so as to 
bring it closer to the product of the post-merger firm, where margins 
are now higher. 
A common version of unilateral effects, the localized competition 
                                                 
70 This would be: (a) where the post-merger HHI is in the range 1000-1800 and the 
HHI increase resulting from the merger exceeds 100; or (b) where the post-merger HHI 
exceeds 1800 and the increase in HHI caused by the merger exceeds 50. See 1992 
Guidelines §1.51. For the HHI, its computation, and the general Guidelines thresholds, see 
4 Antitrust Law ¶¶930-932 (3d ed. 2009). 
71 1992 Guidelines §2. 
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theory that is set forth in the 1992 Merger Guidelines,72 can be seen 
in the following example.73
Before the merger, Firm A's price was constrained by the ability 
of consumers to switch to other goods, including Firm B's product, 
and the constraint imposed by the latter is removed as a result of the 
merger. Similarly, Firm A's constraint on Firm B's pricing is also 
eliminated as a result of the merger, and we would want to consider 
the possibility that the merged firm would now be in a position to 
 Suppose that Firm A and Firm B each sell 
a single brand in a differentiated product market. In the initial pre-
merger equilibrium, Firm A sells 100 units at a price of $2 per unit 
and faces a demand curve for its output with an elasticity of -2. Thus, 
a 10 percent increase in the price that Firm A charges would lead to 
a 20 percent reduction in the quantity that Firm A sells. Some of 
these lost sales would result from consumers switching to other 
brands of the product (including the brand offered by Firm B), while 
other lost sales would result from consumers buying other goods 
altogether. If the constant marginal cost of production for Firm A is 
$1 per unit, a 10 percent price increase would not be profitable; it 
would lead to increased profits (or contribution to fixed costs) of 
$0.20 on the 80 units that it would continue to sell, or $16, but at a 
cost of $1.00 profit on each of the 20 units that are no longer 
purchased, or $20. Alternatively, Firm A would earn a profit of $96 by 
selling 80 units at a markup of $1.20, as opposed to the $100 profit it 
would earn by selling 100 units at the original $1 markup. 
To see how a merger between Firm A and Firm B could change 
this situation, suppose that 25 percent of the sales that Firm A would 
lose as a result of the 10 percent price increase would be captured 
by Firm B as consumers switch to alternative brands, and that Firm B 
is also selling its output at a $1 markup over marginal cost. If Firm A 
acquires Firm B, the profits that the merged firm earns on the five 
units diverted from A's brand to B's brand are no longer lost when 
the price of Firm A's brand is increased, and the $0.20 price increase 
is now profitable. Against the $20 loss of profits from reduced sales 
of brand A, the merged firm gains $16 on the 80 units of brand A that 
it continues to sell plus an additional $5 on the increased sales of 
brand B, for a total of $21. 
                                                 
72 Id., §2.21. 
73 Similar examples are presented in Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated 
Products, 10 Antitrust 23, 24 (Spring 1996); Jonathan B. Baker, Contemporary Empirical 
Merger Analysis, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 347 (1997); Jonathan B. Baker, Unilateral 
Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis, 11 Antitrust 21(Spring 1997). 
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raise the price of brand B. This would depend on the willingness of 
consumers to switch to other products in response to an increase in 
brand B's price and the extent to which those sales would go to 
brand A. The analysis of the proposed merger should not stop with 
the demand side either. Subsequent steps should include an inquiry 
into the ability and willingness of other nonmerging producers to 
respond to the price increase by changing their prices or promotion 
activities, repositioning their brands to make them closer substitutes, 
or by entering new brands. Any of these responses could lead to an 
increase in the number of consumers who switch from brand A and 
may make the post-merger price increase unprofitable. 
Accommodating responses by rivals, on the other hand, would tend 
to make the post-merger price increase larger. Cost savings that 
arise as a result of the merger may also reduce the incentive to raise 
price, and if sufficiently large could actually lead to price 
decreases.74
Note also the importance of the markup (the difference between 
price and marginal cost) for Firm B to the calculation. If the markup 
for Firm B were only $0.50, say because Firm B has higher costs, 
the additional profit to the merged firm on sales to consumers 
switching from brand A to brand B is only $2.50 ($0.50 times 5 units), 
which is no longer sufficient to make the price increase profitable. 
Conversely, if the markup on Firm B's output were $1.50, the merger 
would make the 10 percent price increase profitable if only 20 
percent (four units) of the lost sales of brand A were diverted to 
brand B.  One troublesome result of this analysis is  that, just as the 
Merger Guidelines generally, the methodology tends to find larger 
markets as prices are higher in relation to cost, thus leading to the 
 
Note that Firm B need not be the “closest” substitute for Firm A, 
in the sense that more consumers switch to Firm B than to any other 
firm in response to an increase in the price of Firm A's brand. Even if 
50 percent of the sales that Firm A would lose as a result of the 10 
percent price increase would be captured by Firm C, the merger 
between Firms A and B would still make a unilateral price increase 
profitable. All the analysis requires is that a significant fraction of the 
lost sales be diverted to brand B; if only 10 percent of the lost sales 
(two units) are diverted, the additional $2 of profit on the increased 
sales of brand B is not sufficient to make the 10 percent price 
increase profitable for the merged firm. 
                                                 
74 See Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, 10 Antitrust 23, 24 (Spring 
1996). 
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claim that the methodologies we use to assess mergers commit a 
version of the “Cellophane” fallacy.75
The critical factors in the demand side of this analysis are the 
own-price elasticity of demand for Firm A's brand, which determines 
the sales of brand A that will be lost in response to a price increase, 
and the fraction of those lost sales that will be captured by Firm B. 
The latter has been termed the Diversion Ratio; it is related to the 
cross-price elasticity of demand for brand A with respect to the price 
of brand B, to the own-price elasticity of demand for brand A, and to 
the pre-merger sales of both brands.
 
76 In one set of circumstances, 
the Diversion Ratio is related to the shares of the two firms; 
specifically, if N percent of sales that are lost by Firm A result from 
consumers switching brands (with 100 - N percent resulting from 
purchases of goods outside the market) and if all brands are equally 
“close” or “ distant” to each other,77 the Diversion Ratio between 
brands A and B reduces to (0.01 × N × S B)/(1 - S A), where SA and 
SB are the shares of brands A and B, respectively.78
Unilateral Effects Facilitated by Capacity Constraints or 
Differential Costs 
 More generally, 
however, other evidence, including statistical estimates of the 
demand elasticities will be required. 
 
Introduction 
A merger can also facilitate unilateral price increases in the 
                                                 
75 The “Cellophane” fallacy consist in concluding that a firm lacks monopoly power 
because it would lose too many sales in response to a given price increase, when cross 
elasticity of demand is in fact high because the firm is already charging a monopoly price.  
See 2B Antitrust Law ¶533 (3d ed. 2007). 
76See Carl Shapiro,Mergers with Differentiated Products, 10 Antitrust 23, 24 (Spring 
1996); and Robert Willig, Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger 
Guidelines, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 281 (1991). 
77 The assumption that all brands are equally close underlies the so-called “logit” 
model used to simulate the effect of mergers. See Werden & Froeb, The Effects of Mergers 
in Differentiated Prodcuts Industries: Sturctural Merger Policy and the Logit Model, 10 
J.L. Econ. & Organ. 407 (1994). 
78 Thus, if 75 percent of sales that are lost by Firm Aresult from consumers switching 
brands and 25 percent result from consumers switching to goods outside the market, all 
brands are equally “close” or “distant” to each other, and the shares of brands A and B are 
20 and 25 percent, respectively. The Diversion Ratio between brands A and B would be 
(.75)(.25)/(1-.20) ≈ .23; approximately 23 percent of the sales lost by brand A would be 
diverted to brand B. 
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special situation where (1) nonmerging firms in the market cannot 
readily increase their output except at significantly higher cost; and 
(2) the merger places the post-merger firm in a unique position to 
make “all or nothing” offers to a relatively small group of large 
buyers.  Theoretically this theory can apply to a merger in an 
undifferentiated market – that is, where all sellers make an identical 
product. 
Consider this example: a market contains several relatively small 
sellers who cannot readily increase their output; as a result, buyers 
must typically obtain their needs by purchasing from two or more 
sellers. Suppose, for example, that the selling market has eight firms 
producing 100 units each. Four of the firms have costs of $5 per unit 
and another four firms have costs of $6 per unit. But a large buyer 
needs 300 units, which it could generally obtain before the merger 
for $5 per unit by forcing the four lower-cost firms to bid against each 
other. But now suppose that any two of the four lower-cost firms 
should merge and immediately raise their price to $5.49, telling the 
buyer that it will sell either all or none at that price. The other two 
low-cost firms continue to compete with each other, but neither of 
them nor the two in combination have sufficient capacity to meet the 
large buyers' needs. In this situation, the best deal the buyer can 
obtain is to purchase 200 units from the post-merger firm for $5.49 
and take competitive bids from the other two low-cost firms, 
presumably purchasing the remaining 100 units for $5.00. This would 
give the buyer total costs of $1,598. If it rejected the post-merger 
firm's offer, its most favorable position would be to purchase the 200 
units from the two non-merging low-cost firms at $5.00 and the 
additional 100 units from one of the high-cost firms at $6.00, giving 
total costs of $1,600. 
Note that (1) the price increase in the illustration is significant, 
from $1,500 to $1,598, or about 7 percent; (2) the price increase is 
unilateral, in that the remaining two low-cost firms continue to 
compete with each other and the four higher-cost firms continue to 
compete with each other for the trade of smaller buyers; but (3) the 
price increase will not occur if the remaining two low-cost sellers are 
able at equivalent costs to increase their aggregate output to 300 
units, thus satisfying the large buyers' entire demand.79
                                                 
79 See Jonathan B. Baker, Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis, 
11 Antitrust 21 (Spring 1997), who uses somewhat different illustrations and cites the 
merger of two large pharmacy chains, Rite Aid and Revco, as matching the facts of one of 
the illustrations. The principal buyer was Blue Cross, who preferred to deal with a single 
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Government Guidelines 
The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines80 state that the 
government may challenge mergers when nonmerging rivals are 
subject to binding capacity constraints that prevent them from 
increasing their own output significantly in response to the merged 
firm's output reduction to below pre-merger levels. Such a merger is 
most likely to be challenged where such capacity constraints are 
unlikely to be removed within two years or existing excess capacity is 
significantly more costly to use than capacity currently in production 
and where the merging parties account for at least 35 percent of the 
market.81
                                                                                                                            
large pharmacy rather than a large group of smaller ones, but who would be forced to pay a 
higher price as a result of the merger. 
 
However, the analysis exaggerates the ability of mergers of small market share to yield 
high increases. Baker illustrates with a “market” of ten firms whose respective marginal 
costs are 1, 2, 3, … 10, each of whom produces a single unit; and a buyer who requires 
seven units. Before any merger and under perfect information the buyer pays a price of a 
little under 56. Each of the seven low-cost sellers knows that it can charge any price up to 
eight before the buyer will turn to the eighth seller; and so each of these sellers will bid just 
under eight. But if any two of the seven low-cost sellers should merge and make an all-or-
none offer, rejecting that offer would force the purchaser to turn to sellers eight and nine, 
thus permitting each actual seller in the market to bid a price just under nine. As a result, 
the price of the seven units goes from just under 56 to just under 63. 
Baker then posits that this is a merger that reduces the number of firms in the market 
from 10 equal firms to 9 (eight one-unit firms plus one two-unit firm), and raising the HHI 
from 1000 to 1200. Thus a merger covering only 20 percent of the market yields a price 
increase of 12.5 percent. See Baker, id. at 26 n.29. However, the marginal costs differences 
are so significant that much smaller market definitions would be warranted. Firm 1 has 
marginal costs of 1, firm 2 of 2, firm 3 of 3, and so on. Under usual market definition 
criteria firms 1 and 2 together would constitute a relevant market because even high-cost 
firm 2 could raise its price by 50 percent to 3 without losing sales. As a result, a merger of 
firms 1 and 2 would be counted as a merger to monopoly. If firms 1 and 3 were to merge, 
their collective sales plus the sales of firm 2 would count as a market, for firm 3 could still 
raise its price by one-third above its costs without incurring consumer defections to firm 4. 
In that case post-merger market shares would be 67 percent for firm 1-3, and 33 percent for 
firm 2, yielding an HHI of 5578, more than triple the Guidelines threshold for high 
concentration and presumptive illegality. See 4 Antitrust Law ¶932a (3d ed. 2009). 
Of course, if one completely ignores costs and looks at current prices, then the smallest 
relevant market consists of firms 1-7.  See also Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, 
Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers, ch. 3, in Handbook of Antitrust 
Economics (Paolo Buccirossi, ed., MIT Press, 2008). 
80 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 1992 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines §2.22. 
81 See Foster, No. 07-352, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47606 (D.N.M. 2007), motion for 
preliminary injunction denied, FTC v. Foster, 2007 WL 1793441 (D.N.M. Apr. 29, 2007) 
(concluding that the FTC defined the geographic market too narrowly and that non-
merging entities would be able to reposition themselves in response to a post-merger price 
 Hovenkamp 33 
                                                                                                                            
increase).  The FTC ultimately dismissed the complaint.  See Foster, 2007 WL 2985369 
(Oct. 3, 2007). 
